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or more than six years 
the trade talks of the 
World Trade Organization 
(WTO) have been stalled, main-
ly on account of differences in 
countries’ levels of ambition for 
reducing support to and pro-
tection of agriculture. The ex-
piration of the U.S. president’s 
trade negotiating authority 
on June 30, 2007, raised the 
prospect of longer delay. More 
recently, however, the unprec-
edented food crisis may have 
created an environment for 
reducing the divergences in 
countries’ negotiating positions, 

















WTO Negotiations on Agriculture
and Developing Countries
The Doha Round of trade talks has been
deadlocked since July 2006 mainly on account
of differences relating to agriculture. If the
negotiations eventually succeed in establishing
a fair and harmonious agricultural trading
system  it will have far-reaching implications
for trade and economic prospects of
developing countries.
To understand the reasons underlying the
protracted stalemate and to assess the
prospect of agreement on various proposals
the trading community  needs to be initiated
into the intricacies of the WTO  rules and
modalities of the negotiations. This  volume
provides an authoritative analysis of the
provisions of the WTO agreement and of their
evolution and fills an important gap in the
existing literature.
The study examines the implementation
experience of key members of the WTO and
traces developments in the negotiations up to
the recent impasse. Using India as a case
study, the authors suggest ways of negotiating
and strategizing for developing countries.
They offer tough but realistic recommendations
regarding market access, subsidies, special
and differential treatment of developing
countries, and other issues in negotiations.
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This book will interest students and
researchers of agricultural economics, trade,
and law. It will also be useful to policymakers,
trade development agencies, and practitioners
in understanding the recent history of
agricultural trade talks.
ANWARUL HODA is presently a member of
Planning Commission, Government of India.
Earlier he was the Deputy Director General in
the World Trade Organization. He has
published several books on WTO agreement
and tariff negotiations.
ASHOK GULATI is Director in Asia,
International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI), Washington, DC. He has co-authored
The Subsidy Syndrome in Indian Agriculture
(OUP 2003) and co-edited The Dragon and
The Elephant: Agricultural and Rural Reforms
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Lack of progress toward establishing a fair and harmonious agricultural 
trading system has plagued the World Trade Organization’s Doha 
Round of trade talks. Because the results of the Doha Round could 
have far-reaching implications for the trade and economic prospects 
of developing countries, the trade community requires an authoritative 
analysis of the rules and modalities of the negotiations. This book, 
coauthored by an insider to the trade talks that led to the establishment 
of the WTO, ﬁlls this gap. 
The book offers a detailed analysis of the provisions of the WTO’s 
Agreement on Agriculture and the modalities of the negotiations. It 
examines the implementation experience of key members of the WTO, 
and then traces developments in the negotiations up to the recent 
impasse. In light of these considerations, and on the basis of a case 
study of India, the authors propose the elements of a negotiating 
position and strategy for developing countries.
The authors offer tough but realistic recommendations regarding tariffs, 
market access, treatment of sensitive or special products, and other 
aspects of international trade. This book will be of particular interest to 
researchers and practitioners as well as students seeking an in-depth 
knowledge of the recent history of agricultural trade talks.
ANWARUL HODA is a member of India’s Planning Commission; earlier he was 
a deputy director general in the World Trade Organization. ASHOK GULATI is 
IFPRI’s director in Asia, prior to which he headed IFPRI’s Markets, Trade, and 
Institutions Division. Before joining IFPRI, he was a NABARD Chair Professor 
at the Institute of Economic Growth, India, and a member of the Economic 
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intensified at Geneva. To aid developing-country negotiators, the 
book WTO Negotiations on Agriculture and Developing Countries (published 
for IFPRI by the Johns Hopkins University Press and Oxford Univer-
sity Press—India) offers the first authoritative analysis of the rules 
and modalities on which governments of developing countries can 
rely and suggests a negotiating strategy for developing countries.
The hisTorical  
And negotiAting Contexts
The story of agricultural trade liberalization began in 1947, 
when the representatives of 23 major trading nations met 
in Geneva and entered into a trade compact that was to 
provide the foundation of the multilateral trading system 
in the postwar world. In the decades that followed, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), as 
the treaty came to be known, became the fountainhead of 
successive initiatives for the liberalization of world trade, 
and the industrialized countries made great strides in 
lowering trade barriers. For the most part, however, these 
countries excluded temperate-zone agricultural products 
from the mainstream of liberalization. Indeed, trade policies 
in this sector in the industrialized countries evolved in the 
opposite direction, toward greater protection.
The first serious attempt to set world agricultural 
trade and production policies right was made during the 
Uruguay Round (1986–94) and resulted in the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, of 
which the Agreement on Agriculture was a constituent 
element. The WTO Agreement envisaged that negotiations 
for the “Continuation of the Reform Process” would be 
initiated one year before the end of the implementation 
period, which translated into the year 2000.  An early 
attempt at initiating these negotiations at the Seattle 
Ministerial Conference ended in fiasco in December 1999 
without agreement even on the next step in the process.  
About two years later WTO members agreed to launch 
comprehensive negotiations in Doha in September 2001, 
but progress has been beset with difficulties. The Cancún 
Ministerial Conference collapsed in September 2003.  After 
a halting resumption in July 2004, negotiations made some 
progress leading up to the Hong Kong Conference in 
December 2005 but finally stumbled in July 2006.
The ministers declared in Doha that the needs and 
interests of developing countries lay at the heart of 
the work program they approved. For many developing 
countries, and particularly poorer countries, nothing is 
more important than agriculture, upon which most or 
many of their people depend for their livelihood. The farm 
subsidies doled out by the industrialized countries, coupled 
with tariff barriers maintained at unconscionable levels, 
have historically depressed the world prices of temperate-
zone agricultural products and severely affected the 
economies of many developing countries.
Given the importance of agricultural negotiations to 
developing countries, we have endeavored to develop 
the strategy that would be in the best interests of 
developing countries to adopt in the Doha Round.  
Although developing countries have diverse agricultural 
situations, most of them share commonalities, which 
should enable them to take a broadly similar position. 
Most developing countries outside the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are 
low-cost producers of farm products and many of them 
earn large amounts of foreign exchange from exporting 
these products. They have large populations dependent on 
agriculture for their livelihood but also substantial sections 
of low-income consumers. They generally use domestic 
support and export subsidies on a far smaller scale than 
do the industrialized countries. In fact most of them do 
not have the financial resources to subsidize agriculture on 
a scale comparable to the OECD countries.  A common 
feature of the tariff profiles of many developing countries 
is the big gap between the bound and applied levels of 
agricultural tariffs. Certain groups of developing countries 
have concerns that set them apart from others, but all 
countries should have an equal stake in ridding the world 
economy of economic distortions in agriculture. Some 
countries may need to address the specificities of their 
situation by supplementing the negotiating objectives for 
developing countries in general with additional goals to 
take into account their concerns.
Key Findings  of the study
An analysis of the experience with implementation of 
the Agreement on Agriculture raises doubts about the 3
soundness of the framework created in the Uruguay 
Round to reverse many decades of protectionism in 
agriculture and to establish new rules to liberalize 
agricultural trade and production policies. From the 
beginning it was widely felt that only meager liberalization 
was actually achieved, and most heavily protected products 
seem to have experienced no liberalization at all. The 
principal industrialized countries retained policies of 
support and protection with a high degree of economic 
distortion.
In the European Community (EC) the process 
of compulsory conversion of nontariff measures led 
to prohibitively high tariffs. Certain direct payments, 
which were exempted from reduction commitments, 
provided an opportunity to reinstrument trade- and 
production-distorting measures subject to reduction 
commitments: industrialized countries reduced the use 
of export subsidies but replaced them with exempted 
direct payments. There was little change in the overall 
subsidization of the export market.
In the United States the Uruguay Round failed to 
bring about any significant reduction in market access 
barriers and domestic subsidies for traditionally supported 
products. The new rules proved ineffectual and did not 
constrain the United States from considerably increasing 
the level of domestic support by introducing four 
consecutive packages of market loss assistance payments 
in 1998–2001 or from consolidating and entrenching these 
emergency packages and adding another layer of domestic 
support through new legislation in 2002.
The decision to exempt decoupled income support—
where payments are not related to production, price, 
or the use of factors of production—from reduction 
commitments on the grounds that it results in no or 
minimal distortion in trade and production is a major flaw 
in the design of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. In the 
real world full decoupling is unachievable, and virtually all 
support measures that result in payments to farmers have 
more than a minimal effect on trade and production.
The Agreement on Agriculture has also implied no 
significant change in the agricultural policies of developing 
countries. The low level of domestic support and export 
subsidies in these countries ensured that the general level 
of obligations did not significantly bite into their policies, 
and in market access they were accorded a flexibility that 
far exceeded their need for tariff protection.
In the Agreement on Agriculture the principal 
industrialized countries retained beneficial treatment for 
themselves in many ways, while giving a lower level of 
flexibility to the developing countries by way of special 
and differential (S&D) treatment. The developing countries’ 
preoccupation with S&D treatment in the Uruguay Round 
did not serve them well because it deflected attention 
from the central task of getting the industrialized countries 
to reduce their extremely high levels of support and 
protection substantially and meaningfully.  Although it 
enabled the developing countries to fend off pressures for 
liberalization, S&D treatment proved to be a more potent 
negotiating tool for the industrialized countries by helping 
them influence the developing countries to demand fewer 
real reforms.
If reform is deep enough it can be applied equally 
by the developing countries without becoming too 
burdensome for them. Strident demands for S&D 
treatment undercut efforts to obtain such reform. 
The moment one negotiating country or group of 
countries seeks flexibility in applying the modalities for 
liberalization, others also seek corresponding changes 
in the dispensations applicable to them. One departure 
spawns another and generates a downward spiral that 
shrinks the liberalization package. Indeed, in a politically 
difficult area like agriculture, the tendency may be to grant 
requests for flexibility easily with the hidden agenda of 
securing reciprocal flexibility elsewhere. With the emphasis 
that many developing countries put on flexibility for special 
products, it was inevitable that the industrialized countries 
would come out strongly for matching treatment of 
sensitive products.
ImplIcatIons   FOR POLICyMAkERS
Developing countries must make a fundamental shift in 
their approach in the ongoing Doha Round negotiations. 
They need to focus less on S&D treatment and more 
on equal treatment. Industrialized countries will need to 
be subjected to much more moral and political pressure 
before they give up their highly distorting agricultural 
policies. One way to apply such pressure is to challenge 
them by proposing deep reforms in agriculture that are 
designed, to the maximum extent possible, for uniform 
application to the entire WTO membership. Because 
developing countries are already far advanced in the 
ongoing negotiations in seeking S&D treatment, the way 
to secure meaningful liberalization from the industrialized 
countries is to moderate the distance between the general 
and S&D levels of treatment.
With regard to market access, the most important 
aspect negotiators must grapple with is tariff peaks, which 
are now more than 200, 300, and even 500 percent in 
some industrialized countries. Tariffs must therefore be 
capped at a reasonable level.
The success of developing countries in securing 
additional flexibility for special products is undoubtedly 
politically important for the domestic agricultural 
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flexibility in the tariff treatment of sensitive products. 
Developing countries need to exercise caution, however, 
in asking for great flexibility over a wide range of products. 
The real limiting factor is the impact that the coverage of 
special products (and indeed the decision on their tariff 
treatment) would have on the negotiations as a whole. 
If the aim of developing countries is radical reform, as it 
should be, those countries should limit their demand for 
flexibility for special products and confine it to a small 
proportion of agricultural tariff lines.
Much more important from the perspective of India 
and other developing countries is the Special Safeguards 
Mechanism, whose establishment is mandated by the 
July Framework. In addition to the threat to domestic 
agriculture constituted by the major industrialized 
countries’ high levels of domestic and export subsidies, 
developing countries are also vulnerable to sharp periodic 
fluctuations in prices, which are a regular feature of 
international commodity markets. The Special Safeguards 
Mechanism should allow members to impose additional 
tariffs temporarily when there is a surge in imports or 
when such a surge is threatened by the fall in international 
prices. The new mechanism should be simple and 
provide for automatic recourse to safeguard measures 
once the price or volume triggers are reached, without 
any requirement of injury test.  Also, to persuade the 
industrialized countries to accept a ceiling on tariffs, it may 
be necessary to give them access to the mechanism.
Getting the industrialized countries to sharply reduce 
trade-distorting domestic support is of paramount 
importance, so that developing countries can get access 
not only to industrialized-country markets, but also to 
third-country markets. The predicament of the cotton-
producing countries of West Africa highlights the urgency 
of bringing about a radical reduction in trade-distorting 
domestic support in the industrialized countries in order 
to check the slide of some of the poorest countries of 
the world into deeper poverty. We recommend maximum 
emphasis on achieving a deep cut in overall trade-
distorting support (OTDS) to bring it as close as possible 
to 5 percent of the total value of production in both 
industrialized and developing countries. The only departure 
that developing countries should make from the overriding 
requirement that the rules apply uniformly to all countries 
is to ask for a continuation of the exemption for generally 
available investment and input subsidies (for low-income 
and resource-poor farmers). One of the book’s most 
important suggestions is that decoupled income support 
and other direct payments, which have been exempted 
under the Green Box (but are used principally by the 
industrialized countries), be limited only to small farmers, 
similar to the criterion that applies to the exemption of 
input subsidies for developing countries. Adding such a 
criterion would eliminate an important shortcoming of the 
agreement.
The agreements securing the parallel elimination of all 
forms of export subsidies and setting the end date of 2013 
have been significant achievements. Developing countries 
should consolidate these achievements by leaning toward 
a stricter approach in the negotiations on disciplines on 
export financing support, exporting trading enterprises, 
and international food aid.
If deep reform of world agriculture proves 
unattainable, then the developing countries’ strategy in the 
negotiations in the Doha Round would have to change. 
They would then have full justification for asking for 
full-blown S&D treatment. With the prevailing levels of 
agricultural subsidies in the industrialized countries, the 
developing countries cannot afford to lower their guard by 
accepting anything more than minimal reductions in tariffs. 
The formula for reducing tariffs by developing countries 
must therefore be substantially differentiated from the one 
applicable to the industrialized countries in terms of depth 
of cut as well as period of implementation. The absence 
of commitments to meaningful reduction of domestic 
support by industrialized countries would also create 
the conditions for reviving S&D provisions with respect 
to export competition. In that eventuality developing 
countries would be fully justified in asking for indefinite 
continuation of the current provision, which exempts them 
from reduction commitments on freight subsidies and 
subsidies related to marketing costs on export shipments.
In the absence of agreement on deep reform of world 
agriculture, it would be crucial from the point of view 
of developing countries that the “peace clause” is not 
revived. Given the potential for the domestic support of 
the industrialized countries to adversely affect the trade 
interests of developing countries in all markets, there is 
no reason for developing countries to acquiesce to a poor 
outcome on agriculture in the Doha Round.  A prolonged 
crisis would be better than a conclusion that perpetuates 
the existing distortions in world agriculture.